PANEL 3:  Secrecy and the Juvenile Justice System by Gage, Hon. Michael et al.
Journal of Law and Policy
Volume 9
Issue 1SYMPOSIUM:
The David G. Trager Public Policy Symposium
Behind Closed Doors: Secret Justice in America
Article 5
2000






Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Law and
Policy by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Hon. Michael Gage, Bonnie Rabin, Eve B. Burton, Nicholas Scoppetta & Jennifer L. Rosato, PANEL 3: Secrecy and the Juvenile Justice
System, 9 J. L. & Pol'y (2000).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp/vol9/iss1/5
Hon. Michael Gage*
Thank you. First, when I saw in the description of this
conference the terms "Secret" and "Behind Closed Doors," I
thought they added a pejorative tone to the inquiry and the
discussion. I think perhaps in this segment, I at least will be talking
a little more about privacy and the privacy interests of the people
who come to family court.
Second, certainly the juvenile justice and juvenile delinquency
issues in family court are among the easier cases to deal with in
terms of what can and should be made public. I think that because
Commissioner Scoppetta is here, as well as Bonnie Rabin, who has
litigated many child protective proceedings, we will talk a lot about
neglect and abuse cases and the truly innocent victims who are the
subject of these proceedings.
I think perhaps I should just mention that the family court in
New York State as we know it, and the statute providing for it, are
less than forty years old.1 And since I have been more or less
directly involved in family court since the late 1960s, I have a
rather good historical context and recollection of the way it was
and what it has become, and perhaps ideas on where it should go
in the future.
I remember that when I was a law guardian in the late 1960s
and early 1970s, we were operating under the same statute and a
similar rule. But there is no question that the culture of the
institution was one of closure and as a result, the press and the
media, with very few exceptions, just assumed that they could not
get information, that they did not have access to the family court.
That is how the idea developed that it was a closed proceeding,
which clearly presents certain dangers.
Former Administrative Judge for the New York City Family Court.
See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 113 (McKinney 1999) (noting that the original
Family Court Act was enacted in 1962).
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The current Rule 205.4, which deals with access to family court
proceedings, has only been in effect for about two and a half
years.2 The old rule was actually not that different. Because it
provided that in exercising its inherent and statutory discretion, the
court could exclude a person or the general public, certain factors
should be considered. The factors that the old rule referred to are
exactly the first three factors in the current rule.3 We can discuss
those factors a little in a few minutes.
That culture of letting people assume that the court was closed
perked along through the early 1990s. There were exceptions.
Reporters came to court if they were doing a long-term story. It
was, however, very carefully controlled, and depending on who the
judge was, the press could be excluded entirely.
Then came the tragic case of Elisa Izquierdo, in November of
1995. 4 I believe it is safe to say that the case resulted in a fire-
storm of criticism and inquiry about court practices and child
welfare practices, and resulted in the change in the rule.
The family court, of course, was intended to provide a forum
and procedures to resolve very intimate kinds of cases, whether
they be neglect and abuse cases, paternity cases, or juvenile
delinquency cases. And all throughout Rule 205.4 there are
references to the fact that the general public may be excluded from
2 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 205.4 (1997).
See id. § 205.4(b)(1)-(3) (listing the factors a judge may consider as
whether a person having access to the courtroom "is causing or is likely to cause
a disruption in the proceedings," whether "the presence of the person is objected
to by one of the parties, including the law guardian, for a compelling reason,"
or whether "the orderly and sound administration of justice, including the nature
of the proceeding, the privacy interests of individuals before the court, and the
need for protection of the litigants, in particular, children, from harm, require that
some or all observers be excluded from the courtroom").
4 See Marc Peyser, The Death of Little Elisa, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 11, 1995, at
42 (reporting that even after school officials at PS 126 called the state and city
child-welfare offices for the fifth time, that Elisa Izquierdo had been abused, the
state refused to investigate because there was insufficient evidence, and the Child
Welfare Administration would not comment on what action, if any, was taken,
because of confidentiality laws); see also In re Ruben R., 641 N.Y.S.2d 621
(App. Div.1996) (constituting the legal proceedings relevant to the situation of
Elisa's siblings after Elisa died as a result of her mother's abuse).
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certain proceedings, such as delinquency, paternity, or child welfare
proceedings.5 But the decision whether to exclude the press and
the public was always left to the discretion of the judge. And, of
course, in exercising that discretion, the judge was to be guided by
certain considerations.
After all, it was always understood that the privacy interests of
the families, particularly the children, who are the subjects of these
proceedings, needed to be weighed against the public's interest in
knowing how the court operated and what was happening in these
high profile or not so high profile cases.
The case of Elisa Izquierdo really cried out for a review of the
court practices. The loudest, strongest, and most reasoned crier was
the Daily News, as represented by Eve Burton.6 Shortly after that
case, and at the suggestion of Chief Judge Judith Kaye, I put
together a very small group of people - Eve Burton representing
the media, the then head of the Juvenile Rights Division of the
Legal Aid Society, a representative of ACS appointed by Commis-
sioner Scoppetta, and myself - to really try and advise what
interests were involved, how the press could be allowed into
proceedings more readily, and what factors should be considered.
We had numerous meetings and certainly did not come to a total
consensus, but our efforts resulted in a change in the rule. I think
we would all agree that the first declarative sentence at the
beginning of this rule is notable in that it states that the "Family
Court is open to the public."7 That was a rather radical change
from the old rule.
5 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1043 (McKinney 1999) (providing that the general
public may be excluded from any hearing); id. § 531 (excluding the general
public from any courtroom where paternity proceedings are taking place); id.
§ 341.1 (excluding the general public from juvenile delinquency proceedings).
See generally N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 205.4.
6 See, e.g., Barbara Ross, Sex Abuse of Girl Is Cited in Autopsy, DAILY
NEWS, Feb. 1, 1996, at 19 (reporting that Eve Burton, a lawyer representing the
Daily News and the New York Post, argued that the media should have access
to the courtroom during the custody hearing of the Lopez family since evidence
of abuse in the Lopez home was already disclosed in the criminal court
proceeding of the murder of their daughter, Elisa Izquierdo).
7 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 205.4(a).
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The rule then provides that "[t]he public, including the press,
is permitted in all the public areas."8 Rule 205.4 has had the
laudable effect of changing the standard practice. Now, a request
to exclude the press requires a hearing, supportive evidence must
be introduced, and an exercise of discretion excluding anyone must
be preceded by findings made by the judge.
I will not address the Izquierdo litigation extensively because
I think one or two other members of the panel may concentrate on
that. It is sufficient to say that one can hardly imagine a more
sensitive case, a case in which the interest and the purpose of
family court - a court, the purpose of which, by operation of
statute, is to protect children from injury and maltreatment, and to
help safeguard their physical, mental and emotional well-being -
would come more strongly into play. Although the trial judge in
that case wrote what I thought was a very reasoned decision to
allow the press in, as a result of an appeal by Legal Aid represent-
ing the children, the First Department Appellate Division also
wrote a reasoned analysis as to why the press should not be let in.9
I think these decisions show how difficult and sensitive these issues
are.
At a recent event where I spoke, I queried whether Ruben R.,' °
which is the name of the appellate division decision, and the
analysis therein is still good law. In my view, all the statutory
provisions in the Family Court Act allowing a judge to exclude the
public are still valid, as they have not been amended or repealed.
However, I believe that adoption of new Rule 205.4" on access
resulted in a true change, one that judges were ready and most
were eager for, since so many of the judges felt their hands were
tied. Judges wanted people to come in and see what they were
trying to accomplish but, as has been mentioned this morning,
often every one of the parties and their attorneys wanted the press
excluded. That resulted in a battle between the judge and the media
against the parties. As a result of the new rule, proceedings have
become much more open.
8 id.
9 In re Ruben R., 641 N.Y.S.2d at 623-29.
'0 Ruben is one of Elisa's five half-siblings. Id. at 622.
" N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 205.4.
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We may have time a little later to talk about whose interests
really need protecting. Clearly there exists an interest in a fair trial
for someone accused of juvenile delinquency. But I think more in
need of protection are the interests of children who have no say
and no responsibility for what goes on in the court. That is, the
children who are victims of abuse, be it sexual, physical or neglect.
Is it simply the identity of the child or of the family? No, because
in many cases that identity is known. Then what needs protection
is the discussion of the behavior and circumstances of the abuse.
Another issue that presents itself is at what point in family court
proceedings we should strive to protect privacy interests. Often
these cases come up as a result of an arrest. This translates into the
fact that there is police information, prosecutor's information, and
the court's information. All of this information is already public.
But, as often also happens, the case becomes of interest after
the fact, after the proceeding has occurred, when something
disastrous happens. 12 What then should the right of the press be
to access old information? In addition, one must take into consider-
ation the future of the child five or ten years down the line. It used
to be that family court could guarantee that once a juvenile
delinquency case was concluded, the records were sealed; no one
had to state that they had been convicted or even arrested for
anything, and they could have a second chance. I think we have
reason to know that juvenile court records are sometimes the
subject of all kinds of uses.13
12 See, e.g., Anonymous v. Anonymous, 705 N.Y.S.2d 339, 340 (App. Div.
2000) (stating that the court must balance the interest of keeping the courtroom
open to the public "against the court's special interest in protecting minors from
harm where sensitive matters are involved"); People v. Riggins, 678 N.Y.S.2d
469, 475 (Sup. Ct. 1998) (stating that reports of child abuse and maltreatment in
possession of social services - including photographs and other information -
are confidential and may only be made available to specified entities if the court
is satisfied that information contained in those records is necessary for
determination of charges before such body).
13 See In re Steven R., 467 N.Y.S.2d 545, 547 (Fam. Ct. 1983) (discussing
Section 375.1 of the Family Court Act, which requires the sealing of all
documents brought into a juvenile delinquency proceeding that resulted in favor
of the juvenile); see also Shannon F. McLatchey, Media Access to Juvenile
Records: In Search of a Solution, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 337, 342 (1999) (noting
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The last thing I want to say is that I think from a judge's
perspective, the change has gone remarkably smoothly. It is true
that there were a few glitches and perhaps what Eve Burton would
think of as someone trying to gag the press in certain areas. But it
has worked really well. I think the next frontier, which will most
likely be the subject of further discussion if not litigation, is access
to other kinds of information, that is, records and reports from
family court.
that "modem society is less inclined to protect the confidentiality of juvenile
offenders at the expense of the public's right to be informed about juvenile crime
and the manner by which the system handles the wrongdoers").
Bonnie Rabin*
I have asked myself a similar question to that of Judge Gage,
whether the Izquierdo case would have been treated differently or
whether the appellate division would have decided it differently in
light of the new rules.
I have struggled with this question a little, knowing the debate
or balance that the litigator has to focus on and whose interest we
are trying to protect in the family court. From my practice and my
feeling about the Family Court Act, and from the cases I have read,
the subject of every proceeding in family court is the child. In the
tragic case of Elisa Izquierdo, had there not been any other children
remaining, there would have been no child protective proceeding.
In a certain way, that case really was not about Elisa. The case
was about Ruben R. and his siblings: what they would face, what
their needs would be, who would provide them with foster care,
and how the psychological issues that needed to be dealt with
would be addressed.
For those of you who do not know, most of the hearings in the
family court are bifurcated. There is a fact-finding hearing where
the allegations have to be proved by a preponderance of the
evidence, and there is a dispositional hearing where hearsay
evidence comes in.' The information that is part of the disposition-
Member, Cohen Hennessey & Bienstock.
Cases involving a child's interest are frequently complex, involving
multiple issues. The cases are often adversarial. Almost every proceeding in
family court requires a hearing, that is, the admission of documentary and
testimonial evidence. Many of the relevant statutes dictate bifurcated hearings,
including preliminary hearings and separate fact-finding and dispositional
hearings. It is not unusual for a family court proceeding to encompass more than
one evidentiary hearing requiring different standards of proof. See N.Y. FAM. CT.
ACT §§ 340.01-347.1 (McKinney 1999 & Supp. 2000) (providing for a fact-
finding hearing in juvenile delinquency proceedings); id. §§ 350.01-355.5
(providing for a dispositional hearing in juvenile delinquency proceedings); id.
§§ 744-46 (defining proceedings concerning whether a person is in need of
supervision); id. § 832 (defining a fact-finding hearing in family offense
proceedings); id. § 833 (defining a dispositional hearing in family offense
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al hearing is actually extremely significant. It is often the product
of mental health reports, psychological reports, reports from foster
care agencies, statements from case workers, school reports, and a
background investigation and report that addresses all the facts and
circumstances of a particular family.
The reason I am bringing that up in this context is because,
unlike a criminal court proceeding, the family court really must
look at what a child's individual needs are. As a result, the family
court has unique information not only about the child who is before
the court, but also about the child's extended family members.
Within those reports, which I think are presumed to be confidential,
there would be information such as employment, the identity of the
true biological parent of a particular child, whether there has been
an adoption in that particular family, and details of any sexual
abuse. No matter what has happened at the fact-finding level,
information that does not exist in other types of hearings will come
into evidence: for example, the details of the sexual abuse of a
child, and perhaps abuses suffered by other members of that child's
family, the details of the physical abuse, and information concern-
ing a family member's sexual orientation, even if that person is not
before the court.2
proceedings); id. § 1044 (defining a fact-finding hearing in child protective
proceedings); id. § 1045 (defining a dispositional hearing in child protective
proceedings); id. § 1046 (pertaining to evidence in child protective proceedings);
see also In re Jose R., 83 N.Y.2d 388, 393-94 (1994) (discussing speedy
adjudication of the fact finding phase); In re Dorothea B., 611 N.Y.S.2d 749, 750
(Fam. Ct. 1991) (discussing Family Court Act Section 350.1(2), which provides
that "in all cases where the respondent is not detained, 'the dispositional hearing
shall commence not more than fifty days after.. . [the fact finding phase]"'); In
re Randy G., 487 N.Y.S.2d 967, 969 (Fam. Ct. 1985) (discussing the different
evidentiary standards for each proceeding).
2 See In re Yolanda D., 673 N.E.2d 1228, 1230 (N.Y. 1996) (discussing
whether Yolanda's uncle met the statutory definition of a legal guardian for the
child and the disclosure of details of sexual abuse by her uncle); In re Jessica R.,
581 N.E.2d 1332, 1333 (N.Y. 1991) (remitting case to family court to determine
if respondent's motion for a psychological examination was needed to enhance
procedural fairness); In re Karen Machukas, 667 N.Y.S.2d 817, 820 (App. Div.
1998) (noting that an amended petition for an order of protection set forth
numerous acts of mental and physical abuse allegedly committed by respondent,
not all of which were proven at the hearing); In re Joseph A., 664 N.Y.S.2d 393,
118
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I think the existence of such information is part of what makes
me the lone person up here who feels quite protective about child
protective proceedings. I actually think that even in the juvenile
delinquency cases that are heard, the children are often innocent
victims. Having represented quite a few of them in a multitude of
different types of cases, I know that counseling a child in a
delinquency proceeding - a child who has been accused of
committing an act that, if he or she had been an adult, would be a
crime - calls for some special safeguards.
The cases you all probably know about are most likely the
better known cases of Malcolm X's grandson3 and similar cases.4
393 (App. Div. 1997) (stating that an order adjudicating a juvenile as a
delinquent provided details about acts that would constitute a class D felony for
sexual abuse in the first degree if committed by an adult); In re Female Infant
F., 594 N.Y.S.2d 303, 304 (App. Div. 1993) (involving a contested private
adoption placement proceeding in which details about the circumstances leading
to the adoption as well as the relationship between the biological parents were
revealed); In re Adoption of Jessica XX, 434 N.Y.S.2d 772, 773 (App. Div.
1980) (appealing the denial of an unwed natural father's motion to have an
adoption order vacated in which details of the father's separate paternity action
were revealed); In re Lori M., 496 N.Y.S.2d 940, 940-41 (Fam. Ct. 1985)
(discussing a petition filed by the mother of a juvenile daughter alleging the
daughter was a person in need of supervision and including details about the
daughter's sexual orientation, her personal feelings about her orientation, and her
mother's response to her orientation); see also Rachel L. Swarns, Three Years
After A Girl's Murder, Five Siblings Lack Stable Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4,
1998, at Al (detailing the abuse suffered by Elisa Izquierdo and her siblings
before the little girl's death).
3 In re News Media Coverage, 662 N.Y.S.2d 207, 207, 210-11 (Fam. Ct.
1997) (granting the press limited access to the courtroom in a juvenile
delinquency proceeding where a twelve-year-old boy was accused of setting the
fire that killed his grandmother).
' See, e.g., In re Katherine B., 596 N.Y.S.2d 847, 853 (App. Div. 1993)
(holding that child protective proceedings be closed to the public and the media
due to the possible harm to the child from public disclosure of parental neglect
and abuse even though a prior kidnapping and imprisonment of the child by an
adult friend received substantial publicity); In re Keisha T., 38 Cal. App. 4th
220, 225-26 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the juvenile court had discretion in
granting media access to confidential court records in juvenile dependency cases
and that the conflict between allowing public access and protecting children was
a matter courts must resolve on a case-by-case basis).
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Those, however, are not the typical cases. My fear has always been
that the sensationalism of these aberrational cases is what ends up
affecting reform. I cannot say that I have yet to see the law reform
we are talking about really affecting the day-to-day lives of the
children I have represented, or of the way the cases are handled in
court. It is true that many more judges are now allowing more
people into the courtroom. With respect to whether the same
arguments are being made about how to protect the children, I do
not think Ruben R.5 actually would be decided very differently
today. I think the psychological harm that was discussed in the
affidavits submitted to the court gave the appellate division quite
a cause for concern.6 The court also, I believe, looked to what the
child advocate would need to focus on in terms of representing that
particular child.
One of the clear chilling effects to a litigator is what informa-
tion can be brought up to help the client with what the client
actually needs and what information may actually harm the child
more than help her.
For example, in a case like Ruben R., where the child advocate
probably wanted a specific finding and wanted the court to know
all the relevant facts and details, there may have been a kind of
restraint on letting the public know facts that the remaining
children, who were alive and had to go on with the rest of their
lives, would have to be confronted with. These children still had to
go to school, had to get into foster homes, and had to go to
different camps and programs. They had to deal with the communi-
ty. They would have to deal with their peers when the most
' 641 N.Y.S.2d 621, 622, 629 (App. Div. 1996) (discussing the abuse and
neglect suffered by Ruben R. and Elisa Izquierdo's other surviving siblings, and
ordering the proceeding "closed to the public and the press").
6 Id. at 628. The affidavits of the psychologist and the social worker averred
that "the children's therapy would be severely undermined because of fears
concerning the divulgement of information to the public; further emotional
scarring would occur; and further erosion of family bonds and rejection of their
parents would be inevitable." Id. In addition, the increased publicity "would
undoubtedly exacerbate the children's anxiety and fear of rejection by friends,
teachers and schoolmates [and thus] heavily impact ... their sense of self-
esteem." Id. This potential "revictimization" of the "already emotionally fragile
[children] . . . would result in irreparable harm." Id.
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intimate details of their family life had been thrown into the
headlines of the Daily News,7 the Post,8 and other papers. 9 The
child advocate faces those concerns. They are important concerns
because I think one of the issues that has been raised by a number
of different courts around the country is whether, when we get to
the information that we are concerned about revealing, we should
just stop the proceeding, have an argument about it, and then go on
7 See, e.g., Sheila Anne Feeney, Little Murders Though Society Focuses on
Manic Moms, Research Is Lacking on Those Responsible for Child Homicides,
DAILY NEWS, Nov. 28, 1995, at 45 (discussing Elisa Izquierdo case as an
example of manic mothers who kill their offspring); Alice McQuillan & Paul
Schwartzman, Slain 6-year-old Is Laid to Rest in Death, Child Not Abandoned,
DAILY NEWS, Nov. 30, 1995, at 3 (displaying Ruben's full name with an alleged
quote from the crying child that read: "Will my sister go to Heaven?" and noting
that "Elisa Izquierdo is finally at peace. May her mother never find a moment
of it again.").
' See, e.g., Sandy Gonzalez, Mom Indicted as Hundreds Mourn Tragic Little
Girl, N.Y. POST, Nov. 29, 1995, at 5 (describing the funeral service).
9 See, e.g., Lizette Alvarez, A Mother's Tale: Drugs, Despair and Violence;
A Life Mired in Urban Ills Ends in a Daughter's Death, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27,
1995, at B 1 (reporting that Awilda Lopez of Brooklyn, mother of five, was
accused of beating her six-year-old daughter, Elisa Izquierdo, to death while she
was addicted to crack cocaine); Samuel Maull, Mother Indicted in Death of Girl,
6, RECORD (N. N.J.), Nov. 29, 1995, at A04 (reporting that Lopez abused Elisa
until she died, once allegedly using Elisa's head to mop the floor, and that Lopez
was charged not only with first degree manslaughter, but also with endangering
the welfare of Lopez's other children when she exposed them to the abuse
inflicted on Elisa); Mom Faces Murder Count in Daughter's Abuse Death,
GREENSBORO NEWS & REc., Nov. 29, 1995, at A5 (noting that though there was
no evidence of physical abuse of Elisa's siblings, Lopez singled out Elisa,
believing the girl to be possessed by satan, slamming Elisa's head into a concrete
wall two days before her death, and causing her to die from a brain hemorrhage);
Mother Indicted as Child Is Mourned; Murder Charged in Fatal Battering of 6-
Year-Old New York Girl, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 1995, at A22 (reporting that
child welfare officials, though warned about Elisa's parental abuse, defended
their decision to leave Elisa with her mother even though the child was born with
cocaine in her blood, because they said the child wanted to live with her mother,
not her father's relatives, after her father's death); David Van Biema, Abandoned
to Her Fate; Neighbors, Teachers and the Authorities All Knew Elisa Izquierdo
Was Being Abused. But Somehow Nobody Managed To Stop It, TIME, Dec. 11,
1995, at 32 (featuring a cover story including a color photograph of three
Izquierdo children).
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with the proceeding. Fortunately, the appellate division found that
would be incredibly disruptive to the case,'1 especially if the
public access advocates, for example, wanted a stay of the
proceeding each and every time there was going to be a ruling on
whether or not information concerning a certain child should be
elicited or come into evidence.
It is not as though we have not seen the effects of media access
to children's cases even recently. I know the case of a fourteen-
year-old girl who was accused of killing her mother and spent
some eight months in a juvenile detention facility.1 There were
a number of articles on her case. 2 She did very well once she left
the facility, and it turned out she had been a victim of very
extensive abuse. She also did extremely well in high school and
was admitted to Harvard for college. Someone found out about her
past and anonymously sent some information to Harvard, including
newspaper articles about the trial, and Harvard rescinded its
offer.13 I am not saying that happens in every case, but I am
'0 In re Ruben R., 641 N.Y.S.2d 621, 626 (App. Div. 1996) (stating that
interrupting the proceeding "would ... continually disrupt the proceedings and
result in an unduly protracted hearing").
" See Carrie T. Hollister, The Impossible Predicament of Gina Grant, 44
UCLA L. REv. 913 (1997) (discussing the ongoing effects of media coverage of
juvenile proceedings on juveniles, using Gina Grant as an example). Gina Grant,
while living with her abusive mother in South Carolina, allegedly bludgeoned her
to death with a crystal candlestick. After attempting to make the death look like
a suicide and then trying to blame her boyfriend, Gina claimed self-defense,
pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter, and served eight months, including
her pretrial detention time, in a South Carolina detention facility. Id. at 914.
2 See, e.g., Jon Auerbach, Teenager's Case Left Many Puzzled, BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 7, 1995, at 20 (reporting that Gina Grant, a fourteen-year-old
honors student, was accused of bludgeoning her mother to death with a candle
holder and that, even though the teenager first said an intruder murdered her
mother, she later pleaded no contest to manslaughter and maintained that she
acted out of self-defense from an alcoholic mother who verbally abused her);
Lynda Gorov, Support, and Doubts, Follow Student; South Carolina Town Still
Divided Over Teenager's Killing of Mother in 1990, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 10,
1995, at 1 (noting that Grant served six months in a juvenile prison for her
mother's death and was then transferred to a special school for juvenile offenders
in Boston, Massachusetts, which was close to her relatives).
13 See Fox Butterfield, Woman Who Killed Mother Denied Harvard
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saying we cannot think for a moment that just because the case is
over, past issues will not follow these children around, perhaps for
the rest of their lives.
Judge Gage mentioned an article she read in New York
Magazine that addressed public access and the change in the
law.14 I also recall very vividly the sensationalism, the exploita-
tion at the time of the Izquierdo matter. I was not surprised to hear
that, although there were thousands of cases reported in thousands
of articles, two years later, when there were a couple other
notorious cases, they were reported in half the number of arti-
cles.15 My point is that few people follow the children in these
cases and few changes have actually occurred for the original
children in these cases as a result of the law reform. I am not
saying public access can never be beneficial. I actually think that
if the child's lawyer wants media access because the lawyer thinks
some harm is occurring as a result of, for example, the bureaucracy
of the court or a particular judge, or a particular district attorney's
office, or the lawyer wants to show something about the Adminis-
tration for Children's Services, then that is a different matter. But
as I understand the statute and the case law, the interests that need
to be protected are those of the child. Thus, unless the child's
advocate wants the proceeding to be open, I think it should be
closed.
Admission, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1995, at 1 (reporting that Harvard's decision to
rescind the early admission offer to Gina Grant was based on Ms. Grant's failure
to disclose her manslaughter act, which brought into question her honesty and
was, at a minimum, a misrepresentation on her application); Alice Dembner &
Jon Auerbach, Pupil's Past Clouds Her Future: Harvard Rescinds Offer After
Learning That Honors Student Killed Her Mother, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 7, 1995,
at 1 (describing Gina Grant's successes following her mother's death and how
Harvard learned of the actual events that occurred when Gina was a juvenile).
14 Michael Shapiro, Death Be Not Proud, N.Y. MAGAZINE, Nov. 29, 1999,
at 46 (noting that cases of child abuse arising after Elisa Izquierdo's tragedy
attracted less media attention than Elisa's case and stating that Elisa's case
contributed to the opening of family court proceedings).
15 See In re K. R., N.Y.L.J., Nov. 14, 1997, at 29 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.); In re
Augustus C., N.Y.L.J., July 31, 1997, at 22 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.).

Eve B. Burton*
I do not disagree at all with Bonnie Rabin that these are
difficult issues. I think they are very difficult issues, actually. I
would hate to see this debate become one of pro-children or
anti-children because I really do not think that is the case. I think
the debate is whether or not you believe the children are harmed
more by media coverage of judges who are making decisions and
reviewing difficult issues about solutions for very fragile members
of our community often with very tragic lives; or harmed more by
a system of sustained secrecy, where sometimes city bureaucracies,
and other times guardians who are accountable only to the children
they serve, and courts, make decisions behind closed doors. I think
that is how the debate needs to be framed. No one answer is right.
This is similar to the abortion debate: everyone feels strongly about
it and there is no right answer.
Interestingly, however, and Judge Gage pointed this out, the
family court judges who sat on these cases for thirty-five years
behind closed doors ultimately were the judges granting the
applications we were making to open proceedings. Those judges
ultimately know about the lives of these children probably as well
as anybody else who has been working in the system. I also give
tremendous credit in this whole process to Commissioner Scop-
petta, who fairly early on came to conclude that it was a reasonable
debate on both sides and, with a long history of being pro-child,
also came to conclude that proceedings should not be closed, and
worked very diligently with his staff to educate them about opening
the proceedings.
Legal guardians, for the most part, still prefer the shades to the
sunlight. I do not criticize them for that because that is their role.
I do not take the position that every proceeding in every case
should be open, although I will say that the guardians, with very
. Former Vice President and Deputy General Counsel for Daily News, L.P.,
publisher of the Daily News. Ms. Burton is currently the Vice President and
Chief Legal Officer for CNN.
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few exceptions, have taken the position that everything should be
closed. Bonnie Rabin will probably disagree with that, but that is
my experience.
We must remember that there are three types of cases, so that
we just do not discuss this broadly, and different people feel
differently about different types of cases. First, there are abuse
cases, illustrated by the Ruben R. case we discussed.' Second,
there are custody cases, such as Brentrup v. Culkin,2 which was
the original case litigated. In that case we won in the trial court but
lost in the appellate division. This has for all practical purposes
been reversed in what I would call a brilliant decision by the
appellate division just last week, distinguishing the Culkin case.3
Third, there are delinquency proceedings, illustrated by the Shabbaz
case, where, again, we prevailed.4
I believe there is very little legal debate that the prevailing
precedent would allow the media in the courtroom in most
delinquency proceedings and virtually all custody proceedings.
Perhaps, however, there may be some differences in the Ruben R.
category. I think I do agree with Bonnie Rabin that the case would
probably have been decided the same way today, and I am not sure
that it should not have, although I am not privy to all the informa-
tion. Again, it is somewhat difficult to litigate cases when they are
entirely sealed. I may have appeared more unreasonable in
litigating that case than I would have if I had been able to see all
the facts. But based on the little knowledge I have, I think it
probably would have been decided the same way today.
1 641 N.Y.S.2d 621 (App. Div. 1996).
2 679 N.Y.S.2d 820 (App. Div. 1998).
' Anonymous v. Anonymous, 705 N.Y.S.2d 339, 343 (App. Div. 2000)
(holding that child custody and support proceedings may only be closed to the
public if the child's interest requires that such proceedings not be public).
4 In re News Media Coverage, 662 N.Y.S.2d 207, 208-09 (Fam. Ct. 1997)
(granting the press limited access to the courtroom in a juvenile delinquency
proceeding where a twelve-year-old boy was accused of setting the fire that
killed his grandmother); In re Chase, 446 N.Y.S.2d 1000, 1009 (Fam. Ct. 1982)
(rejecting a closure motion by reason of failure to overcome the presumption of
openness and allowing a reporter access to a fact-finding trial in a juvenile
delinquency proceeding).
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Again, for almost two and a half years, the family court has
basically been open to the press and the public. The new rule,
which states, that the family court is open, is subject to a strict
scrutiny constitutional test - as the courts have later interpreted it
to mean - and the burden is now on anyone seeking to close it
rather than keeping it open. New York has joined Florida 6 as one
of only two states in the nation that are now presumptively open.
Other states are working in that direction, for example Ohio in a
case decided recently by its highest court.7 California, for its part,
believes that delinquency cases should almost always be sealed, but
that perhaps protective proceedings should be open because these
children are victims and thus there is nothing really embarrassing
to them to hide.8 In fact, California takes virtually the opposite
position from the New York courts and the New York mentality,
probably as in most other subjects. It is interesting to note,
however, that California may be joining the trend with a slightly
different analysis, but nonetheless towards openness.
In these first two and a half years since Rule 205.4 was
amended,9 there has not been a single case on record where the
public has been barred from the family court, and I really give
tremendous credit for that to Chief Judge Judith Kaye, to Judge
I N.Y. COMEP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 205.4 (1997).
6 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.507(2) (West 2000) (providing that "all hearings...
shall be open to the public, and a person may not be excluded except on special
order of the judge").
7 In re T.R., 556 N.E.2d 439, 451 (Ohio 1990) (holding that juvenile court
proceedings are neither presumptively open nor presumptively closed to the
public, and that the juvenile court may restrict public access if it finds that there
exists a reasonable and substantial basis for believing that public access could
harm the child or endanger adjudication fairness).
8 CAL. FAM. CODE § 214 (West 2000); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 676
(West 2000); see also San Bernardino County Dep't of Pub. Soc. Servs. v.
Superior Court, 283 Cal. Rptr. 332, 334 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that the First
Amendment right of access does not extend to juvenile dependency proceedings);
Cheyenne K. v. Superior Court, 256 Cal. Rptr. 68, 71 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding
that juveniles have no right to exclude the public from a hearing to determine
competency to stand trial on charge of murder).
9 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 205.4.
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Gage, and to Commissioner Scoppetta. As a result, we can look at
some trends to see whether the change is positive or negative.
Although I appreciate Bonnie Rabin's point that fewer cases are
being reported on, pieces about family court proceedings are
reported every single day. Nina Bernstein of The New York Times
certainly has pieces about the family court in many of her art-
icles.1° So does Joanne Wasserman in the Daily News." We may
not be promoting institutional change, but I am not sure that is our
role. We report the facts and there is more reporting daily than
there used to be. Most would agree, I believe - although I do not
'0 See, e.g., Nina Bernstein, In Suffolk Shelter Rules Force Two Into Foster
Care, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1999, at B5 (discussing the case of the first parent
in Suffolk County to lose custody of her children as a direct result of regulations
that make work and other welfare rules a condition of shelter); Nina Bernstein,
New York Faults Hospital for Denying Checkup to Baby Who Starved, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 26, 1998, at B1 (discussing the New York State Department of
Health blaming a hospital, which turned away a mother and her one-week-old
infant because they lacked money or a Medicaid card, for the infant's death five
weeks later of malnutrition); Nina Bernstein, Prosecutor Drops Charges in Case
of Infant's Death, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1998, at B3 (noting that the Brooklyn
District Attorney dropped charges against a woman in a previous case who was
breast feeding her child when it died of malnutrition, and that the case evoked
protests from women's advocates and critics of healthcare); Nina Bernstein,
Work-for-Shelter Enforcement to Begin Dec. 1, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1999, at
B9 (describing the Giuliani administration's enforcement of work requirements
and other welfare rules, which would force parents with children out of shelters
if they fail to comply).
" See, e.g., Joanne Wasserman, Custody Battles Worsen - And Kids Are
Casualties, DAILY NEWS, May 25, 1997, at 4 (noting the effect of increasingly
long and bitter custody cases on children); Joanne Wasserman, Cutoff of Parental
Rights Climbs, DAILY NEWS, Jan. 19, 2000, at 10 (including discussion of federal
Adoption and Safe Families Act and its impact on family court proceedings to
strip negligent mothers of their parental rights); Joanne Wasserman, Haven for
the Kids: While Parents Battle Over Lives Gone Wrong in Family Court, Their
Children Can Play in a Cheerful, Caring Center, DAILY NEWS, Sept. 28, 1997,
at 36 (discussing the Manhattan Family Court Children's Center, a facility where
children are cared for while their parents are in family court); Joanne Wasser-
man, Judge Tries To See Past Pain: Family Court Duty Is a Trial, He Writes,
DAILY NEWS, July 19, 1997, at 15 (describing family court judge's memoir
chronicling his experiences while on the bench); Joanne Wasserman, Tot Abuse
Charge a Family Ordeal, DAILY NEWS, Sept. 24, 1995, at 27 (noting the legal
ordeal faced by a couple wrongly accused of child abuse).
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speak for Bonnie Rabin and the position of advocates - that the
information printed now is probably more accurate than in the past.
Looking at the Elisa Izquierdo coverage as a starting point, I am
confident that what we are writing now is more accurate. I think
most people would agree that what we are writing now is probably
more accurate than when the entire system was sealed. I think
openness encourages better thinking about solutions to children's
problems, both among policymakers and children's advocates and,
frankly, also in newsrooms. Openness has generated a tremendous
amount of discussion in our newsroom. When a six-year-old was
killed recently, we discussed whether the other six-year-old who
pulled the trigger should appear on the front page of the Daily
News with a headline.'2 I suggested we put the child who died on
the front page instead and, after some debate, that occurred. 13 In
fact, I do not think this sort of debate would have happened so
naturally had we not had some experience in dealing with children
in family court. I do not know whether that solves these children's
problems, but it is probably better for the killer that he was not on
the cover of the Daily News.
Before courts were open, the key pieces of stories being
reported relied heavily on confidential sources. I cannot emphasize
enough to the reading public how unhelpful that is to them and
also, frankly, probably to Bonnie Rabin's clients. Often difficulties
exist with confidential sources. That is the nature of a situation
where someone really should not be talking and is not always
giving the full story or has a specific agenda. I also think openness
makes judges and advocates more careful.
12 See Ben Balog et al., Michigan Girl Is Shot Dead: Youngest School
Gunman Kills First-Grader, DAILY NEWS, Mar. 1, 2000, at 3 (reporting on a six-
year-old shooting a classmate with a gun he found at home and brought to
school); Robert Ingrassia, Dad Recalls Boy's Hate-Filled Rages, DAILY NEWS,
Mar. 1, 2000, at 2 (recounting a pattern of abnormally violent behavior); Paul
H.B. Shin, Gun Access Makes Deadly Difference, DAILY NEWS, Mar. 1, 2000,
at 2 (questioning whether a six-year-old can form the criminal intent to commit
murder, and suggesting that the real culprit was easy access to a gun).
13 Her Killer Was Six: 1st Grade Boy Guns Down Girl In Classroom After
Fight, DAILY NEWS, Mar. 1, 2000, at 1 (displaying picture of victim, Kayla
Rollands, on the front page).
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
Thoughtful press coverage from openness has resulted in some
good results for children. In the Shabbaz case there was a discus-
sion about where Malcolm should go for treatment once he pled
guilty.' 4 The press did a lot of digging into the various institutions
that were mentioned. One result from what the press found about
one of the places where the court considered sending him, was the
realization that it had no rehabilitation programs for someone with
an arson background. Subsequently, that information was used by
the judge, for better or for worse, and Malcolm was sent some-
where else, to a place that I think by most accounts has been good
for him. 5 Even his advocates have acknowledged recently to our
reporters that the outcome of the media's investigation has been
positive for the juvenile. 6
In addition, although Bonnie Rabin might take issue with this,
I think openness leads to less sensational reporting. Compare the
Elisa Izquierdo case with the Everett case, where a Mets player
was charged with abusing his children.1 7 Everett was as high
profile a case as the Izquierdo case in terms of the parties and
issues involved. Again, I think most people would say the Everett
reporting was much better.
Often the press coverage of a case is the only way a child
wrongly charged with a crime can be cleared in the eyes of a
14 In re News Media Coverage, 662 N.Y.S.2d 207, 210 (Faro. Ct. 1997).
15 Id. See also Jane Gross, Grandson of Betty Shabazz Is Sentenced to a
Juvenile Center, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1997, at Al (describing the juvenile's
transfer from a Westchester County juvenile detention center to the Hilcrest
Center in Lenox, Massachusetts, which is one of the few in the nation that
accepts juvenile arsonists, over objections of his attorneys); Associated Press,
Malcolm Shabazz Moved to Center to Serve Term, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1997,
at B4 (detailing Malcolm Shabazz's transfer from a juvenile detention center to
a "home that specializes in young arsonists").
16 See Trains, Cranes & Hardheads, DAILY NEWS, Aug. 12, 1997, at 38
(commenting on how new rules of openness in family court create accountability,
and in this particular case, exposed both the ludicrousness of Malcolm Shabazz' s
attorneys' suggestions and the prudence of Judge Spitz's ultimate decision to
send the boy to this particular facility).
17 In re Everett, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 23, 1998, at 30 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.) (describing
how Carl Everett, a player on the New York Mets baseball team, was charged
with beating his children).
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community. There was a case in Schenectady where there was
reporting all the way through. The child was ultimately acquitted
and the press wrote about that. 18 The defense lawyer for the child
said that the press report of his acquittal made it possible for this
child to live in that community again. So, again, what the reporting
does is not all negative.
Also, parents and grandparents, who have often felt that they
are the lonely and unheard voices in the family court system, and
that the child guardian has far too much say over what is good or
bad for the child, in many instances, have welcomed the coverage
and the ability to speak candidly and have the press covering cases
that involve them, feeling that sometimes the decisions were biased
against them and that they now have more of a voice in the
process. 19
Since the establishment of the new rule in favor of openness,
the issue has been whether the media can have access to documents
that are submitted to the court. The rule is silent on that issue.2 °
18 The media were allowed unlimited access to the family court trial of a
fifteen-year-old boy for the accidental shooting of his ten-year-old friend. See
Carol DeMare, Teen Slaying Suspect to Get Psychological Testing, TIMES UNION
(Albany, N.Y.), Sept. 19, 1998, at B 1 (including detailed descriptions of the
hearing obviously written by a reporter who was allowed inside); Bob Gardinier,
Teen Who Killed Pal Given Probation, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Apr. 28,
1999, at B1 (describing interview outside courtroom with victim's father, who
advocated that the case be held in criminal court instead of family court so that
the public could have more access to proceedings); Brendan Lyons, Teen Admits
Accidental Slaying, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Mar. 11, 1999, at B1
(including quotations from the teen's confession and reaction from family
members of the victim who were present in the courtroom); Kimberly Martineau,
Father of Slain Boy Describes His Grief, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Mar. 14,
1999, at Dl (including personal reaction of teenagers who were present at speech
given in courtroom by victim's father).
'9 See Eve B. Burton, Reflections on Open Family Courts: The First 100
Days, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 31, 1997, at 1 (stating that the media act as agents through
which children's issues can be brought to the public's attention, leading to "better
care for children and families").
20 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 205.5 (1997). Though the
revision of § 205.4 specifically provides for increased public access to family
court proceedings, the revised version of § 205.5 fails to make any similar
provisions for family court records and documents. Id; see Burton, supra note
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I would merely argue that you have to read the new rule in a
logical way, that it could be argued that the only instance in which
you do not get documents is if the court proceeding has been
sealed. Otherwise, you should. But again, the language is not clear.
The result in litigating the issue of access to documents in three
cases that we have litigated over the last year is that we get the
documents, including documents entered into evidence and
transcripts.2 ' Not a single document or transcript we have sought
in the family court has been sealed. Again, there have been
arguments against letting us have access to documents, but I would
only suggest that access has made the reporting more accurate.
An interesting side note to what happens when we go into court
and seek access to information is that I have started to get
subpoenas from litigants involved in family court proceedings and
they have taken the position that if we want to be in their business,
they want to be in ours. There exists a statute in New York
protecting journalists from having to turn over notes and inter-
22views. 2 However, in one of the delinquency proceedings, I had
to go all the way up to the appellate division to get a subpoena
quashed because the family court litigators were not familiar with
the New York statute and its strength in protecting confidential
sources and reporters' notes.23 Again, it was an interesting twist
19, at 1 (stating that the language of § 205.5 conflicts with the spirit of increased
public access as expressed in § 205.4 by suggesting that courtroom transcripts
are not to be made public under any circumstances).
2 For an example of recent litigation on the question of public access to
documents in family court proceedings, see Anonymous v. Anonymous, 705
N.Y.S.2d 339 (Sup. Ct. 2000). See also Editorial, Free Press Needs Free Access,
DAILY NEWS, May 6, 2000, at 16 (reporting that seven news organizations
challenged a court ruling that prevented the news media from reviewing court
exhibits already shown to the jury during the Amadou Diallo shooting trial).
22 N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1992).
23 See Krase v. Graco Children Prods., 79 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 1996)
(holding that under § 79-h of the New York Shield Law, a court cannot compel
disclosure/production of unpublished news unless the party seeking such news
makes a clear and specific showing that the sought material is unavailable from
any other source and that such party's claim "virtually rises or falls" without
such news).
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to be suddenly in the defending position, and it brought some
humility to my litigating.
The one area where the media and the court have had some
disagreements, as mentioned by Judge Gage, has been in the prior
restraint area. From time to time courts have issued orders whereby
to gain access to all portions of court proceedings, the press has to
promise the judge not to publish names or addresses of participants
that are disclosed in court.24 I have taken the position that as long
as a judge does not issue an order that is too broad, as a matter of
contract I can agree for my reporters that we want to access the
information and we will behave ourselves. The New York Times
takes a more principled view and deems these orders prior
25restraints.
Again, the use of children's names has created much discussion
in the media. At the Daily News we have been particularly vigilant
in trying not to be inappropriate. In the Shabbaz case, we first ran
the child's photo on page seventy-two while most other newspapers
displayed it on the front page. When the editor-in-chief mentioned
after three days that every other paper in New York City had used
the child's name and photo and now she wanted to move it up
from page seventy-two, I felt that we should still not do so. 26 I
lost that argument. But again we were three days into the story as
opposed to the Elisa Izquierdo story, where the photo was on the
front page the very first day.27
24 See, e.g., In re Ruben R., 641 N.Y.S.2d 621 (App. Div. 1996); In re
Ulster County Dep't of Soc. Serv., 621 N.Y.S.2d 428 (Fam. Ct. 1993); In re S.
Children, 532 N.Y.S.2d 192 (Fam. Ct. 1988).
25 See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976) (holding
that the heavy burden imposed as a condition to securing a prior restraint was not
met); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726-27 (1971)
(holding that only allegation and proof that publication must inevitably, directly,
and immediately cause national harm will support issuance of a restraining
order).
26 Michele McPhee et al., Malcolm X Widow Burned: Grandson Held in
Blaze Horror, DAILY NEws, June 2, 1997, at 3 (reporting that the twelve-year-
old grandson of Malcolm X was charged in the fire that left his grandmother
with third degree bums over eighty percent of her body).
27 Patrice O'Shaughnessy et al., Child's Doomed Life, DAILY NEWS, Nov.
26, 1995, at 5 (accompanying a photograph on page one of Elisa Izquierdo, the
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In all, openness has had many positive ancillary effects and for
that reason I cannot see that Bonnie Rabin would hold it against us.
Ms. Rabin
May I get a chance to respond?
Professor Rosato
After Commissioner Scoppetta gets a chance to speak. Commis-
sioner?
article reports Elisa's death after being held prisoner, beaten, sexually abused and
starved by her mother).
Commissioner Nicholas Scoppetta*
I have been instructed to try to speak about access to the family
court, discuss Elisa's Law,1 respond to the other speakers, and
leave time for questions, all in five to ten minutes. I will try.
We at the Administration for Children's Services have suppor-
ted access to the family court. I view the access and confidentiality
issues in two ways: it is about an open family court and access to
the family court, and an open ACS and access to what is going on
at ACS. Elisa's Law was born as much out of the demand to know
what is happening in the child welfare agency as it was out of the
demand to know what is going on in the family court.
I believe the spectacle of my predecessor, testifying before
legislative committees and being forced to refuse to answer
question after question as to how Elisa's and other cases were
investigated because of confidentiality restrictions, so frustrated the
legislators that they decided it was time for a change in the law.
Only two states, New York2 and Florida,3 have an open family
court, and California 4 is considering a law that would open it up
as well. Thus, this was a radical departure in the process.
It is interesting to hear Judge Gage refer to the fact that it has
always been permissible to open the family court. It was always
* Commissioner for the City of New York's Administration for Children's
Services.
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 422-a (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 2000) (codifying
the disclosure of information pertaining to the "abuse or maltreatment of a child"
under certain circumstances).
2 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 205.4 (1997).
3 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.507(2) (West 1999) (providing that court proceed-
ings shall be open to the public except under circumstances enumerated in the
statute); see also Florida Publ'g Co. v. Brooke, 576 So. 2d 842, 845-46 (Ha.
Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that limits exist as to the information a judge can
keep confidential from the press after asserting his discretionary authority to
close a hearing).
4 S.B. 1391, 1999 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2000) (providing that the public shall be
admitted to juvenile dependency court hearings unless the child's interest would
be harmed).
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within the discretion of family court judges to do so. 5 The culture
of secrecy grew out of a desire to protect children from disclosure
of sensitive information in abuse and neglect cases. As a result,
over the years it just was assumed that family court proceedings
were closed. Chief Judge Judith Kaye then said that family court
is presumed to be open and now it is.6
Our lawyers, for a period of time, felt very protective of the
confidentiality of proceedings in the family court. When that came
to my attention, I instructed our legal staff that, as a matter of
policy, they should presume the court is open. It is the exception
to request a judge to exercise his or her discretion and close the
court. Circumstances that would argue for closing the court would
be extremely personal, highly confidential matters. For example, I
know of one case where the judge, at least for a portion of the trial
or hearing, closed the court because the testimony referred to the
child's prior juvenile delinquency contacts with the family court.
It happened that the child had a history of prostitution and the
judge just did not allow that to be open and available to the public.
5 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 205.4(b) (providing that the
general public or any person may be excluded from a courtroom only if the judge
presiding "determines on a case-by-case basis ... that such exclusion is
warranted in that case," based upon specifically enumerated factors) (emphasis
added); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 166 (McKinney 1999) (prohibiting only
"indiscriminate public inspection" and empowering the court with discretion to
allow inspection of "any" record or papers); see also Department of Soc. Servs.
v. Land, 443 N.Y.S.2d 351, 352-53 (Fam. Ct. 1981) (stating that family court
judges may exercise discretion on a case-by-case basis); People v. Price, 419
N.Y.S.2d 415, 419-20 (Sup. Ct. 1979) (stating that the "[1]egislature has
explicitly given the Court discretion in any case to permit inspection of any
papers or record" and refusing to quash subpoena duces tecum ordering
production of probation intake records of juvenile).
6 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 205.4; Press Release, New
York State Unified Court System, New Rules on Public and Press Access to
Family Court (June 18, 1997) (on file with the Journal of Law and Policy)
(releasing the announcement by Chief Judge Judith Kaye and Chief Administra-
tive Judge Jonathan Lippman that "a new set of rules providing public access,
including access by the media, to proceedings in the New York State Family
Court [were] approved, effective September 2, 1997, by the Administrative Board
of the Courts").
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With respect to other information, however, Elisa's Law is a
statute providing that the child welfare commissioner, at his
discretion, may reveal facts about investigations and how they were
conducted in abuse or neglect cases, with certain caveats.7 The
usual circumstance in which the issue comes up is in the case of
a child fatality or one of serious abuse. The statute is specific about
that.8 Another situation is where someone was arrested for a crime
against a child. There are other circumstances under which the
child welfare commissioner might want to make public information
that is otherwise confidential, but that happens very rarely, such as
in cases where a grand jury gives a report on a certain activity or
an accused puts forth, as a defense, his or her version of events, in
a case of abuse or neglect. Sometimes that will come up as a
defense when they are under investigation or have been arrested.
But usually it is in the event of an arrest or a fatality, and even
then it is entirely within the commissioner's discretion as to
whether or not information will be revealed. The commissioner
must evaluate the particular circumstances and consider, for
example, whether or not the siblings of the child in question might
be hurt by revealing certain information. 9 If so, the commissioner
should not disclose that information. Other conditions are provided
for in the statute, but in every case, the statute states that even
7 N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 422(4)(B) (McKinney 1992). The statute provides:
Notwithstanding any inconsistent provision of law to the contrary,
a city or county social services commissioner may withhold, in
whole or in part, the release of any information which he or she
is authorized to make available to persons or agencies identified
in subparagraphs (a), (k), (1), (m), (n), (o), (p) and (q) of
paragraph (A) of this subdivision if such commissioner determines
that such information is not related to the purposes for which such
information is requested or when such disclosure will be detri-
mental to the child named in the report.
Id.
8Id. § 422-a(1)(d) (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 2000) (providing that
disclosure of child abuse or maltreatment information is allowed if the child
named has died or suffered a serious or critical condition).
9 Id. § 422-a(1) (providing for disclosure "if [the commissioner] determines
that such disclosure shall not be contrary to the best interests of the child's
siblings"); id. § 422-a(5) (providing that the "Commissioner shall consider the
interest in privacy of the ... child's family").
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though conditions are present that allow for the release of informa-
tion, it is still within the commissioner's discretion as to whether
or not the information will be made public.' °
I believe we have successfully resisted the temptation to
exercise our discretion in order to withhold information that would
mute criticism of the agency. This is particularly true in cases
where the child's family has a history with ACS or its predecessor
agencies. We are, of course, keenly aware of the media's interest
in disclosing deficiencies in the execution of government obliga-
tions. So, for example, if a child dies, we are usually asked
whether we have had a prior history with the child and whether
ACS "knows" the child or the child's family. If the answer is no,
that is almost always the end of the media's interest. There will be
little or no mention of the event by the media. If the answer is yes,
it is almost always a very big story because the media can portray
that as a failure by ACS. The story will be that ACS had some
contact with the family and still let the child die. This is generally
the way it plays even though the prior contact might have been ten
years before the child in question was even born. (Our definition
of "known to ACS" is whether we ever had a case with the
family.) It could have been ten years ago. The case may have been
closed a long time ago, and now a new child arrives in the family
and something terrible happens to that child. The media will still
hold ACS presumptively responsible for that fatality because
journalism 101 teaches that it is a newsworthy story if you can
blame a person or entity for the terrible event. However, even
when there is an arrest for a child fatality, it is still within the
discretion of the commissioner to release or withhold the informa-
tion known to ACS. Therefore, despite the statute, if you had a less
enlightened administration than the present one, you might never
get any information about the performance of child welfare
agencies. Of course, I say that tongue in cheek, but in fact, we
have, from the creation of ACS, been accessible to the media. The
family court was closed and confidentiality rules allowed child
o Id. § 422-a(1) (stating that the commissioner "may disclose information
... if he or she determines that such disclosure shall not be contrary to the best
interests of the child").
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welfare administrators to simply refuse to answer questions about
the performance of the agency, no matter how deficient that
performance had been. From the very beginning we have taken the
position that any publicity would be good for reform, in that
publication of deficiencies would force reform. I think this policy
has served us rather well, though it has sometimes caused us pain.
We have learned to live with it.
Elisa's case, which has been referred to several times here
today, did indeed generate a firestorm of publicity - more about
the management of the Child Welfare Administration than about
the family court."l It did, however, contribute to the opening of
the family court. That was a case in which, pursuant to the statute,
we issued a very comprehensive report and described in detail what
had happened in that investigation. 12 It seems to me it was the
most positive thing we could do about a case that had captured the
public's attention and was diligently and aggressively followed by
the media. Elisa was about as extreme an example as you could
find of the system malfunctioning - and malfunctioning may be
too kind a characterization. In Elisa's case, twenty-two separate
agencies were in touch with that family over Elisa's short, six-year
"1 See NYC to Hire 200 for Child Welfare, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.),
Dec. 19, 1995, at B2 (reporting that the "Child Welfare [agency] has come under
scrutiny after the death of 6-year-old Elisa Izquierdo"); Marc Peyser, The Death
of Little Elisa, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 11, 1995, at 42 (reporting that even after school
officials at PS 126 called the state and city child-welfare offices for the fifth
time, that Elisa Izquierdo had been abused, the state refused to investigate
because there was insufficient evidence, and the Child Welfare Administration
would not comment on what action, if any, was taken, because of confidentiality
laws); Michael Shapiro, Death Be Not Proud, N.Y. MAGAZINE, Nov. 29, 1999,
at 46 (noting the hundreds of stories written on Elisa Izquierdo's case and the
resulting focus on child welfare); David Van Biema, Abandoned to Her Fate:
Neighbors, Teachers and the Authorities All Knew Elisa Izquierdo Was Being
Abused. But Somehow Nobody Managed To Stop It, TIME, Dec. 11, 1995, at 32
(reporting that Elisa Izquierdo's death resulted from repeated failures of the Child
Welfare Agency to respond to notifications from Izquierdo's school about her
deteriorating condition).
12 See Press Release, Administration for Children's Services, ACS
Commissioner Scoppetta Announces Completion of the New York City Child
Fatality Review Panel's Findings Concerning Circumstances of the Death of
Elisa Izquierdo (Apr. 8, 1996) (on file with the Journal of Law and Policy).
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life. 13 Twenty-two agencies had an opportunity to offer services,
to detect the danger to the child. Without recounting all the
shocking details, you will remember that this poor child was
tortured, beaten, burned, and starved by her mother before she
finally died. It is unfortunate, in the extreme, that twenty-two
agencies could have had contact with that family and not have
detected, at some point, that this child was in imminent danger.
It is difficult to look at cases like that without wanting to turn
a spotlight on the system and examine how the child welfare
system and hospitals, agencies, churches, individual caseworkers,
and supervisors failed. That is what our report did.
Let me say something else, however. The child welfare system
is a system that has been judged by its failures. The failures,
however, are not the norm. The successes are the norm, but they
clearly do not make big news anywhere. The child welfare system
is very large. We have 34,000 children in foster care right now. 4
At one point, when I first came to the agency, there were 43,000
children in foster care.15 We investigate over 50,000 complaints
of abuse and neglect every year.16 In that whole mix there are
tens of thousands of successes, but those, of course, are not
considered newsworthy. I do not contest that. We all know what
the public wants to read and what attracts our attention. It is
difficult to fault the media for focusing on what the public really
13 Id.
14 See Press Release, Administration for Children's Services, Advisory Panel
Issues Fourth Report Under Reform Efforts Underway at ACS (Mar. 10, 2000)
(on file with the Journal of Law and Policy) (stating that there were 34,099
children in foster care in January 2000); NEW YORK CITY ADMIN. FOR
CHILDREN'S SERV., STATUS REPORT 1: OUTCOME AND PERFORMANCE INDICA-
TORS, app. A at 81 (1998) [hereinafter STATUS REPORT 1] (noting that, as of the
June 1998 status report from ACS, the number of children in the foster care
system has decreased annually since 1991 from a total of 49,000 children); see
also Somini Sengupta, Number of Foster Children in City at Lowest Levels Since
1980's, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1999, at Al.
15 Press Release, Administration for Children's Services, Advisory Panel
Issues Fourth Report Under Reform Efforts Underway at ACS (Mar. 10, 2000)
(on file with the Journal of Law and Policy) (stating that there were 42,789
children in foster care in May 1997).
16 Id.; see also STATUS REPORT 1, supra note 14, at 68, 73.
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does want to know. If you want a well-considered examination of
the child welfare system and the family court, then you should
examine professional journals, I suppose, but not the daily
newspapers or the six o'clock news.
I have found that ACS's lawyers are really quite comfortable
with an open family court. I hear very little about violations of
children's or family's privacy. Remarkably, I think, the media very
often simply do not print the names of children, and when they do,
they use first names only. And I think the media's sensitivity today
to such issues is more heightened than ever before. When I was
looking through some materials to think about what I would say
here this afternoon, I came across one of our old cases from 1991.
There, prominently displayed in a newspaper, was a picture of the
siblings of a child who had been sexually abused. They were
photographed head on, named, and identified. All the information
about those children was displayed right there in the paper.'7
Ultimately, in trying to reform a system like the child welfare
system, which has been terribly dysfunctional for so many years,
openness and attention focused on the system are extremely
important. The media, paying attention to what is not working in
government, can make a real difference. Whether one agrees or not
with a particular paper's version of what is happening, the debate,
the airing of it, is generally productive. I do not look forward to
those calls from the media because I know that, as a general
proposition, they are not calling to compliment me. But that goes
with the turf and media attention has been extremely helpful to us
in implementing reform at ACS.
While ACS has been really quite comfortable with the fact of
an open family court, what some of our people complain about is
what one lawyer calls the "trajectory" of cases in the family court.
Most days in the life of a case do not lend themselves to daily
coverage or the six o'clock news sound bite. The case can take
many weeks, over four or five adjournments, before all the facts
are out.18 The media are usually there on the day when the
"7 Celia W. Dugger, 10 Children Taken From Father in Sex Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 3, 1991, at 21.
18 See Karen Freifeld, A Family Crisis, NEWSDAY, Mar. 21, 1999, at A5
(noting the frequency, range, and severity of delays in family court).
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anticipated sensational testimony will take place. Then the media
do not seek out ACS's response nor attempt to put the "newswor-
thy" testimony in some context. That is what my lawyers complain
about. We must recognize that it is not Court TV and the media
will not cover the case from start to finish, get the direct, the
cross-examination and the redirect so that all parties may fully
explain their positions. We can only hope that ultimately all the
wonderful things we are doing at ACS will come out. Occasionally
we do get those kinds of stories. It happened that the most
favorable coverage most recently was in Eve Burton's paper.
Commentary
THE FUTURE OF ACCESS TO THE FAMILY
COURT: BEYOND NAMING AND BLAMING
Jennifer L. Rosato*
The language of the new court rule governing the family court
seems unequivocal: "The Family Court is open to the public.
Members of the public, including the news media, shall have
access to all courtrooms."' Under this rule, which was promulgated
in 1997, exclusion from New York's family courts is permitted
only in limited circumstances, and only after the family court judge
has made specific findings as to why an exception to the general
rule applies.
I. THE MEANING OF ACCESS
The consensus seems to be that, so far, the rule is fulfilling its
intended purpose of openness. The family court has become
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Thanks to these research
assistants, who provided their quick and able assistance: Melissa Gable, Noelle
Guerin, Stephanie Reich, and Audrey Woo. Special thanks to the esteemed
panelists - Judge Michael Gage, Eve Burton, Bonnie Rabin, and Commissioner
Nicholas Scoppetta - for bringing needed attention to these issues. Final thanks
to Professor Joel Gora who provided guidance and support in planning the
symposium and writing this commentary.
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 205.4 (1997). This section is
consistent with Section Four of the Judiciary Act, which reads: "The sittings of
every court within this state shall be public, and every citizen may freely attend
the same, except that in all proceedings and trials in cases for divorce ... the
court may, in its discretion, exclude therefrom all persons who are not directly
interested therein." N.Y. JuD. LAW § 4 (McKinney 1983).
2 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 205.4 (1997). This section
appears in tension with Sections 341.1, 741 and 1043 of the Family Court Act,
which seem to allow more discretion to limit access. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§§ 341.1, 741, 1043 (McKinney 1999).
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symbolically open in that most perceive the new law as permitting
more opportunities to observe family court proceedings. The court
also has become practically open. For example, "public access to
Family Court proceedings has never been denied in any reported
matter."4 It is also notable that a number of recent news articles
have been based on first-hand observations in the family court.5
But beyond propping open the doors to the courtroom, what is
the future of access? The issue was not directly addressed by the
panelists, but it warrants greater attention. This brief commentary
considers the issue and concludes that the laws to increase access
should be designed to serve two important and related purposes: to
educate the public and to reform the existing justice system.
Specifically, this commentary discusses how the law of access
developed in New York and how the current media coverage tends
toward what I term "naming and blaming" coverage rather than
educating and reforming. It then proposes two changes in the law
that would facilitate better coverage: permitting greater access to
records and easing the ban on audio-visual coverage in the
courtroom.
A. Access to the Courtroom
Most family law cases fall into one of three categories: child
abuse or neglect, custody and visitation, or juvenile delinquency.6
' See supra Panel Discussion remarks of Judge Gage, at p. 105; see also
Open to the Public: The Effect of Presumptive Public Access to New York State's
Family Courts, COMMITTEE ON COMMUNICATIONS AND MEDIA LAW, AssoCIA-
TION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 1-4 [hereinafter Bar Report] (on
file with the Journal of Law and Policy).
4 Bar Report, supra note 3, at 3; see also supra Panel Discussion remarks
of Eve Burton, at p. 132.
' See, e.g., Lynnell Hancock, Families in the Balance, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10,
2000, § 14 (The City Weekly Desk), at 1; Somini Sengupta, Despondent Parents
See Foster Care as Only Option, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 1, 2000, at B1. Somini
Sengupta, In Court, Families Sit Waiting on the Law, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20,
2000, at A36 [hereinafter In Court].
6 See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW §§ 371-392 (McKinney 1992 & Supp.
2000) (addressing, inter alia, child custody and care, visitation, and guardianship
issues); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 301.1-385.2 (McKinney 1999 & Supp. 2000)
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Historically, these cases have proceeded under a veil of secrecy.
With respect to child protection and child custody cases,7 there is
concern that releasing information about the parents' actions and
the children's life circumstances could further traumatize them and
invade their privacy, and such harm would occur through no fault
of their own.8
For example, in In re Ruben R., the Appellate Division reversed
the family court and denied access to the media in a child protec-
tion proceeding involving the surviving siblings of Elisa Izquierdo,
a six-year-old who had died as a result of a horrific pattern of
abuse by her mother.9 The appellate court was concerned that
publicly revealing the details of the siblings' abusive home life
would cause the children greater emotional harm, particularly since
they already had been identified in the press."°
Family court proceedings involving juvenile delinquents also
have been traditionally closed to the press and the public, but
(addressing juvenile delinquency issues); id. §§ 1021-1069 (addressing child
abuse and child protective proceedings); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240 (McKinney
1999 & Supp. 2000) (addressing child support, child custody and protective
orders).
7 Historically, states have allowed more openness in child custody cases than
other types of proceedings involving children. See Mary McDevitt Gofen,
Comment, The Right of Access to Child Custody and Dependency Cases, 62 U.
CHm. L. REv. 857, 871-74 (1995) (arguing that the press should always be able
to attend child custody proceedings provided that limited reporting restrictions
are put in place when necessary); see also In re Ruben R., 641 N.Y.S.2d 621,
629 (App. Div. 1996); cf. Olesh v. Olesh, 540 N.Y.S.2d 123, 124 (Sup. Ct. 1989)
(discussing the private nature of divorce proceedings).
8 See supra Panel Discussion remarks of Bonnie Rabin, at pp. 112-14;
Samuel B. Sokol, Comment, Trying Dependency Cases in Public: A First
Amendment Inquiry, 45 UCLA L. REV. 881 (1998).
9 In re Ruben R., 641 N.Y.S.2d at 624; see also Nina Bernstein & Frank
Bruni, Seven Warnings: A Special Report, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1995, at Al.
'o In re Ruben R., 641 N.Y.S.2d at 622-23, 627. Specifically, some of the
children were identified by their full names and ages, and photographs of some
of the children were published. Id. at 623.
" See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 341.1, 375.1(1), 381.2(2) (McKinney
1999). Section 341.1, for example, allows the "general public" to "be excluded
from any proceeding" concerning juvenile delinquency adjudication. Id. § 341.1.
Moreover, upon the conclusion of a delinquency adjudication the Family Court
Act mandates that "the records of such proceeding.., shall be sealed" when the
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for reasons different from those of child protective proceedings.
Although these children are not innocent victims because they have
allegedly committed adult crimes,1 2 they are not considered
entirely blameworthy. They are still children, without the ability to
fully appreciate the consequences of their actions. 3 They should
not be stigmatized throughout their lifetime by a public record of
their acts.14 Otherwise, the rehabilitative ideal of family court
could not be realized.
Notwithstanding these strong reasons for limiting access to
proceedings involving children, equally strong reasons justify
openness. These reasons were well-articulated by the family court
in In re M.S., 5 a juvenile delinquency proceeding involving a
twelve-year-old boy who set an apartment fire that killed his
grandmother. 16 The case was newsworthy in large part because the
victim was the widow of a former civil rights leader and was
proceeding has been resolved in favor of the respondent. Id. § 375.1(1). Once
these records are sealed, a court possibly imposing an adult criminal sentence in
the future may not make use of these records and consider them to impose a
proper sentence. Id. § 381.2(2); see also Laura Cohen, Kids, Courts and
Cameras: New Challenges for Juvenile Defenders, 18 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 701,
712 (1999) ("It is the hallmark of our juvenile justice system in the United States
that virtually from its inception at the end of last century its proceedings have
been conducted outside of the public's full gaze and the youths brought before
our juvenile courts have been shielded from publicity.") (footnote omitted).
12 See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.2(1) (McKinney 1999 & Supp. 2000). See
generally Janet E. Ainsworth, Youth Justice in a Unified Court: Response to
Critics of Juvenile Court Abolition, 36 B.C. L. REV. 927 (1995).
13 See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness,
Criminal Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
68, 71-72 (1997) (outlining the historical justifications behind the juvenile court
system).
14 See Emily Bazelon, Note, Public Access to Juvenile and Family Court:
Should the Courtroom Doors Be Open or Closed?, 18 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
155, 156-57 (1999); Jan L. Trasen, Note, Privacy v. Public Access to Juvenile
Court Proceedings: Do Closed Hearings Protect the Child or the System?, 15
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 359, 371 (1995).
15 662 N.Y.S.2d 207 (Fam. Ct. 1997), aff'd sub nom. In re Malcolm S., 663
N.Y.S.2d 979 (App. Div. 1997).
16 Id. at 207.
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known for her own accomplishments. 7 The press petitioned for
access and for audio-visual coverage. Although the family court
considered the stigma that might result if the details of the
proceedings were revealed, it concluded that "higher values" were
served by opening the courtroom, including "preserv[ing] the
integrity of public proceedings, avoid[ing] the dissemination of
misinformation, enhanc[ing] public confidence in the court system,
and promot[ing] a better understanding of the Family Court." 8 In
my view, the highest of these values are educating the public about
the justice system and reforming the law.' 9
The values of educating and reforming are not necessarily
reflected in the recent news coverage of family law issues. Instead
of educating and reforming, many stories involve naming and
blaming. If this continues to be the focus of coverage, the positive
effects of opening courtrooms to the public and the press will be
limited.
B. Naming and Blaming
Naming and blaming seem to be the reasons for most stories
related to the family court. By "naming" I mean that access to the
17 Id. at 208. The court also noted the public's concern about increased
juvenile violence and the secrecy of family court proceedings. Id. at 209; see
also Bazelon, supra note 14, at 189.
18 In re M.S., 662 N.Y.S.2d at 210; see also In re S. Children, 532 N.Y.S.2d
192, 198 (Fam. Ct. 1988).
" In re M.S., 662 N.Y.S.2d at 210 (rejecting a closure motion and
maintaining that open proceedings "promote a better understanding of the Family
Court"). See generally Bazelon, supra note 14, at 157, 177-78, 192 (arguing that
public education as to the operation of government and the courts is essential to
good citizenship and is a catalyst of reform); Gofen, supra note 7, at 875 (citing
the need for public scrutiny of dependency and custody proceedings so as to
"promote[] free discussion of governmental affairs by educating and informing
the public about the judicial system"); Karla G. Sanchez, Barring the Media
From the Courtroom in Child Abuse Cases: Who Should Prevail?, 46 BUFF. L.
REV. 217, 225 (1998) (recognizing that open trials educate the public about the
workings of the criminal justice system, and that when a trial proceeds fairly, the
public gains confidence in the system as a whole); Trasen, supra note 14, at 377
(recognizing the laudable aim of closed dependency proceedings, but insisting
that public awareness promotes public confidence in government).
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court is sought to satisfy our society's collective curiosity about a
famous person or our prurient interest in a sensational set of
facts. 2' The cases are neither typical nor do they involve a
particularly difficult issue of family law. In New York, these
naming cases have involved the likes of Macaulay Culkin,21
Malcolm Shabbazz,22 Woody Allen's children,23 the child of
"well-known public figures of great wealth and prominence, '24
and Katie Beers, the child who was sexually abused in a "dun-
geon. 25
For the most part, these cases do not teach us much about the
law governing child abuse, child custody or juvenile delinquency
- let alone how that law should be changed. For example, the
Macaulay Culkin case was worth covering because the case
involved the star of the motion picture "Home Alone, 26 not
20 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 11, at 702 (emphasizing society's curiosity
with juveniles committing crimes); Gofen, supra note 7, at 866 (emphasizing that
curiosity in child custody cases due to bizarre facts by the public is not beneficial
to society or the juvenile justice system); see also supra Panel Discussion
remarks of Commissioner Scoppetta, at p. 138.
21 P.B. v. C.C., 647 N.Y.S.2d 732 (App. Div. 1996).
22 In re M.S., 662 N.Y.S.2d 207 (Fam. Ct.), affd sub nom. In re Malcolm
S., 663 N.Y.S.2d 979 (App. Div. 1997).
23 Allen v. Farrow, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 23, 1992, at 25 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County)
(seeking audio-visual coverage).
24 Anonymous v. Anonymous, 705 N.Y.S.2d 339 (App. Div. 2000).
25 In re Katherine B., 596 N.Y.S.2d 847, 848 (App. Div. 1993).
26 P.B., 647 N.Y.S.2d at 734. Home Alone, released in 1990 is about Kevin,
an eight-year-old boy, who is left home during a Christmas weekend when his
family is running late to the airport for a trip to Paris. Once Kevin wakes up to
find his family missing, he makes the best of the situation by having his run of
an empty house and successfully fending off two would-be thieves. Home Alone
was Macaulay Culkin's claim to fame as his first feature role. See Caryn James,
Holiday Black Comedy for Modem Children, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1990, at
C12. Home Alone is currently twelfth on the all-time list of movie box office
revenue generators. The Top Grossing Movies of All Time at the USA Box Office,
at http://us.imdb.com/Charts/usatopmovies.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2000). As
a result, of his role in the movie, Macaulay Culkin became the highest paid child
actor in movie history. Home Alone's success spawned two sequels as well as
other hit movies starring Macaulay Culkin. James A. Martin, Mac Attacks in
Home Alone, (Nov. 14, 1997), available at http://ew.com/ew/ar-
chive/0, 1798,112173211 home%2balone,00.html.
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because the public would learn about the shortcomings of the "best
interests of the child" standard that governs custody determina-
tions.27 The Katie Beers case was notable in large part because it
involved the gruesome image of a child being sexually abused in
a dungeon, not because it pushed the edges of child neglect law.28
These kinds of cases teach the public as much about family law as
the O.J. Simpson case taught us about criminal law - not very
much.2 9
The other type of case in which access is often sought is one
that focuses on "blaming." Here, a case or story is newsworthy
because it seeks to blame some person or entity for a child's
tragedy.3 ° The best example of such a case is that of Elisa Izqui-
erdo, a six-year-old who died from severe parental abuse even
though a number of agencies had contact with Elisa's family before
her death.3' The question that occupied the press was "Whose
neglect caused her death? '32 Other examples of naming and
27 P.B., 647 N.Y.S.2d at 734. The case involved allegations of alcohol and
drug abuse, and domestic violence, allegations similar to those made in many
custody cases involving not-so-famous children. Id.
28 See, e.g., Kidnapped Girl Was Imprisoned in Coffinlike Chamber in
Dungeon, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Jan. 16, 1993, at A3. This case also appeared to be
newsworthy because it involved an extensive search for the young victim after
she disappeared. Id.
29 Compare Christo Lassiter, The Appearance of Justice: TV or Not TV -
That is the Question, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 928, 973-77 (1996)
(opining that despite enormous media coverage of the O.J. Simpson trial, the
public was provided with no greater insight into the workings of the criminal
justice system), with Roger Cossack, Commentary, What You See is Not Always
What You Get: Thoughts on the O.J. Trial and the Camera, 14 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 555, 559-62 (1996) (discussing what the public learned
from watching the O.J. Simpson case).
'0 See Bazelon, supra note 14, at 181; see also supra Panel Discussion
remarks of Commissioner Scoppetta at pp. 138-41.
31 See In re Ruben R., 641 N.Y.S.2d 621 (App. Div. 1996); see also Mychal
L. Feldman, The Child Welfare System and Its Implications on the Best Interests
of the Children, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 615, 626-30 (1998); Bernstein &
Bruni, supra note 9, at Al.
32 See, e.g., Bernstein & Bruni, supra note 9, at A3 (documenting a pattern
of "error, omission and illegality"); Russ Buettner, Elisa's Death is System's
Shame: Blistering Probe by State, City Cast Wide Net of Blame, DAILY NEWS,
Apr. 9, 1996, at 5 (explaining findings of reports).
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blaming abound.33 In a more recent case, one prominent newspa-
per published a number of articles about a five-year-old child with
cerebral palsy who died even though her family had been in
contact with welfare caseworkers, a psychologist, and two private
agencies.34 Much of the coverage focused on determining how
blame for the girl's death should be apportioned.35
In general, blaming stories are more valuable than naming
stories in that they are more likely to lead to education and reform.
The coverage of the Elisa Izquierdo case is a good example of this
positive effect because much of the coverage was focused on
exposing significant deficiencies in the existing confidentiality
laws. These laws prevented agencies from revealing vital informa-
L" See, e.g., Celia Dugger, Litany of Signals Overlooked in Child's Death,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1992, at Al (reporting that the high rate of caseworker
turnover was partially responsible for not revealing a mother's prior abuse and
boyfriend prone to violence); Michele McPhee et al., City Said B'klyn Girls Were
Fine, Court Sez, DAILY NEWS, July 3, 1998, at 4 (reporting that city officials
repeatedly told a judge that two teenage girls were doing well after being taken
out of foster care and returned to their home, months before their parents were
arrested for committing rape and incest); Joe Sexton, Officials Fault City's
Inaction in Abuse Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1996, at B1 (discussing city
agencies' failure to protect an eleven-year-old child from his abusive father).
4 See, e.g., Somini Sengupta, Contact With a Web of Agencies Failed to
Prevent a Disabled Girl's Death, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2000, at B 1.
" See Nina Bernstein, Girl's Death Underscores Complexity of Child
Welfare, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2000, at A37 (discussing the difficulty involved
in changing administration policy in reaction to highly publicized cases); Nina
Bernstein & C.J. Chivers, Disabled Girl is Found Dead, Amid Signs of
Malnutrition, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2000, at B 1 (reporting that a grandmother of
a child killed as a result of malnutrition blames the Administration for Children's
Services for failing to respond to an e-mail and phone call reporting the neglect
by parents); John Marzulli, Gran: City at Fault in Girl's Death, DAILY NEWS,
May 20, 2000, at 19 (reporting that child welfare officials ignored repeated
complaints from the child's grandmother); Graham Rayman, Examiner Rules "5-
year-old" Died of Neglect, NEWSDAY, June 15, 2000, at A17 (reporting that a
coroner's determination that a child's death was caused by neglect and that there
is a continuing probe as to the culpability of city child welfare officials); Amy
Waldman, Mother's Account Conflicts With Grim Details of Severely Disabled
Girl's Death, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2000, at B2 (reporting the results of a child
welfare investigation concluding that the child was receiving "adequate care").
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tion about children at risk or children who had died from abuse.36
Following the extensive coverage of the Izquierdo case, the laws
in New York were changed."
The problem with a focus on blaming is that it has a distorting
effect. Specifically, it has a tendency to exaggerate the systemic
problems reflected in a particular case and fails to recognize other
more fundamental problems with the system. It also fails to
recognize the positive attributes of the system, which are not
considered sufficiently newsworthy. 38
Of course, the law cannot dictate to the press what it considers
newsworthy. And it is debatable whether journalists have any duty
to tell stories that are intended to educate the public or lead to
meaningful legal reform.39 But laws can be enacted to encourage
36 See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 31, at 628-35 (detailing New York law
prior to the enactment of Elisa's Law).
3' Elisa's Law has been codified in a variety of statutory provisions. See,
e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 20(5)(a) (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 2000)
(mandating the creation and disclosure of child fatality reports); id. §§ 372(4)(a),
409-a(9)(a), 409-f(2), 442 (mandating that reports be made available for city and
state audit purposes); id. § 422-a (providing for investigations of abuse and
neglect and their disclosure); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240 (McKinney 1999 &
Supp. 2000) (dealing with "unfounded" registry reports in custody and visitation
in custody and visitation disputes); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 651-a (McKinney
1999) (same); see also Lizette Alvarez, Report in Wake of Girl's Death Finds
Failures in Child Agency, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1996, at Al (reporting that the
Mayor of New York "called Elisa's death a catalyst for reform"). Changes not
only included greater openness, but also hiring more caseworkers and providing
more training. Id.
38 See supra Panel Discussion remarks of Commissioner Scoppetta, at p.
140.
'9 See supra Panel Discussion remarks of Eve Burton, at p. 128. The
American Society of Newspaper Editors' Statement of Principles announces that
"[t]he primary purpose of the gathering and distributing news and opinion is to
serve the general welfare by informing people and enabling them to make
judgments on the issues of the time." Todd F. Simon, Libel as Malpractice:
News Media Ethics and the Standard of Care, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 449, 474
n. 122 (1984) (quoting Statement of Principles (American Society of Newspaper
Editors 1975), reprinted in W. RIVERS ET AL., RESPONSIBILITY IN MASS
COMMUNICATION 289-91 app. A (1980)). The statement of principles further
provides that "[jioumalists should respect the rights of people involved in the
news, observe common standards of decency and stand accountable to the public
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media coverage that will more regularly educate and reform.
Reform should not come about because "[t]he bright lights of the
media shine on a dead child's battered body, and for a short time
the system kicks into high gear. '
II. TOWARDS EDUCATING AND REFORMING
Overall, journalists need meaningful access to legal proceedings
that will allow them to tell stories that are more truthful, nuanced,
and representative of the system - so that ultimately the stories will
educate and reform. To begin accomplishing these goals, I suggest
changes in the existing New York rules governing the confidential-
ity of records in the family court41 and governing the use of
cameras in the courtroom. Specifically, I suggest a more nuanced
approach of different rules for different types of records and a
cautious retreat from the ban against cameras in the courtroom.
A. Access to Records
Under the current law - a patchwork of statutes and rules -
access to records seems to embody a presumption of confidential-
ity. According to Section 166 of the Family Court Act, "[t]he
records of any proceeding in the family court shall not be open to
indiscriminate public inspection. However, the court in its discre-
tion in any case may permit the inspection of any papers or
records. 42 Also, the New York court rules implicitly curb dis-
closure of records in family court by specifically delineating the
types of persons who may obtain access to "papers" there.43
for the fairness and accuracy of their news reports." Id.
40 Jerry Harris, Postmortem: After Elisa. CWA Shifts Gears Following
Another Abused Child's Death, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Dec. 12, 1995, at 14.
41 Such changes also should extend to custody matters decided in New York
Supreme Court.
42 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 166 (McKinney 1999).
43 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 205.5 (1997). For example, the
rule permits access only to persons caring for the child, persons representing the
child, the authorized representative of the child protective agency or probation
service, and the agency granted custody of the child and its attorney. Id.
§§ 205.5(b)(1),(4).
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Papers are defined broadly and include "pleadings, legal papers
formally filed in a proceeding, findings, decisions and orders and
... transcribed minutes [of hearings.]" 44 Similarly, in divorce
proceedings, the confidentiality of court papers is presumed. 5
Other provisions limiting access to records relate to particular kinds
of proceedings, such as child protection,46 juvenile delinquency,47
and adoption.48
The reasons for limiting access to documents - such as
protecting children's privacy, reducing stigma, and avoiding further
trauma - do not justify the breadth of the existing limitations on
access to records. The law should better distinguish between
different kinds of documents that pose different degrees of risk to
children: transcripts, documents actually introduced into evidence,
and other documents (such as psychological reports) that have not
been introduced into evidence. The first category, transcripts,
deserve the same presumption of openness as access to the physical
courtroom.49 A transcript is a written record of the day's procee-
dings. Affording the press access to a transcript actually may
increase accurate reporting because there is less reliance on the
reporter's notes. It also may facilitate reporting of a newsworthy
proceeding when the physical limitations of the courtroom would
not easily permit media presence, or when the importance of the
case does not become evident until after a proceeding already has
44 Id. § 205.5.
45 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 235(1) (McKinney 1999). Under this section,
papers include "pleadings, affidavits, findings of fact, conclusions of law,
judgment of dissolution, written agreement of separation or memorandum thereof,
or testimony, or any examination or perusal thereof." Id.
46 See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERv. LAW § 422 (McKinney 1999 & Supp. 2000)
(providing for a state-wide child abuse registry); id. § 424-a (providing for access
to information in state registry); id. § 424-c (outlining duties of commissioner
regarding reports); id. § 444 (providing for confidentiality of records).
47 See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 306.1 (McKinney 1999) (fingerprinting);
id. § 375.1 (outlining the procedure for sealing delinquency records when the
proceeding terminates in favor of the respondent); id. § 375.2 (sealing of court
findings); id. § 381.2 (use of juvenile records in other courts).
4' N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 112 (McKinney 1999) (adoption from agencies);
id. § 114 (adoption orders); id. § 115 (private placement orders).
41 See Bar Report, supra note 3, at 34-36.
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begun. This may be particularly applicable in family court where
trials often proceed on a piecemeal basis, with a number of
adjournments. Moreover, harm to a child caused by the release of
a transcript is commensurate to that caused by permitting physical
access to the courtroom. It should be governed by the Rule 205.4
standard requiring that the harm be demonstrated in a particular
case.
The second category, documents that have been introduced into
evidence in the proceeding, do not deserve the same deference as
transcripts, but should be obtainable by the press when procedural
safeguards can adequately protect the children's interests. If the
reporter is to tell a truthful story that ultimately will educate and
reform, she needs to be more than a passive observer in the
courtroom. The documents may help illuminate weaknesses in a
witness' story, and may even deepen the meaning of the story
because the document is material to the issues in the case.
Children's countervailing interests affected by the release of
admitted records often can be accommodated through protective
orders that limit dissemination but do not prevent it altogether.5 °
Such orders may include redaction of identifying and sensitive
material.5" In the Ruben R. case, a protective order would not
have been effective because the children already had been
identified by name and through photographs. 52 But now that
situation should be the rare rather than the usual case, because the
press ordinarily does not reveal children's identities or other
identifying information. 3
Only in the third category of documents, those not introduced
into evidence, should the presumption against access be applied.
50 See generally N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 205.4(b)(4) (1997)
(showing a preference for protective orders over general exclusion); In re Ulster
County Dep't of Social Services, 621 N.Y.S.2d 428, 432 (Fam. Ct. 1993)
(finding that a protective order best protects competing interests).
"' See In re Ulster County, 621 N.Y.S.2d at 432; see also In re S. Children,
532 N.Y.S.2d 192, 193 (App. Div. 1988).
52 In re Ruben R., 641 N.Y.S.2d 621, 627 (App. Div. 1996).
" Such a restriction may be court-imposed, see Bar Report, supra note 3,
at 32-34, or assumed voluntarily by the press, see supra Panel Discussion
remarks of Eve Burton, at p. 133.
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For example, in Augustus C., the court limited access to psycho-
logical reports and other private documents, even though the court
agreed to open the courtroom.54 The presumption in favor of
confidentiality for these types of documents should be overcome in
exceptional circumstances, when the need is great and privacy can
be preserved.
Distinguishing between different types of records is not the
only way to encourage educating and reforming. Reconsidering
New York's current ban on cameras in the courtroom is another
way, albeit with more potential for abuse.
B. Cameras in the Courtroom
Currently, cameras are banned in New York courts (including
family court) under Section 52 of the Civil Rights Law.55 Al-
though a general ban on cameras in the courtroom has been in
effect since 1952,56 cameras were permitted on an experimental
basis between 1987 and 1997. 57 Under this program, which was
governed by court rules, 58 a trial court reviewed the appropriate-
ness of audio-visual coverage in a particular case, after considering
a number of factors. These factors, specifically delineated in Rule
131.4, include the type of case involved; whether the coverage
would cause harm to any participant; whether the coverage would
interfere with the fair administration of justice; whether the
proceedings would involve lewd or scandalous matters; the
objections of the parties and prospective witnesses; and the
physical limitations of the court.59 Rule 131.4 also requires that
the trial judge "give great weight to the fact that any party,
prospective witness, victim, or other participant in the proceeding
14 In re Augustus C., N.Y.L.J., July 31, 1997, at 22 (N.Y. Faro. Ct.).
55 N.Y. CIv. RIGHTs LAW § 52 (McKinney 1992).
56 People v. Boss, 701 N.Y.S.2d 891, 893 (Sup. Ct. 2000); see also Coleman
v. O'Shea, 707 N.Y.S.2d 308, 310 (Sup. Ct. 2000).
" Boss, 701 N.Y.S.2d at 893. This lengthy experiment was authorized by
N.Y. JuD. LAW §§ 218(1), (11) (McKinney Supp. 2000).
58 See N.Y. COMp. CODEs R. & REGS. tit. 22, §§ 131.1-131.8 (McKinney
1993).
'9 Id. § 131.4(c).
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is a child." 6 Although the rules do not seem to favor broadcasting
in the way that Rule 205.4 favors access, 61 they do provide
authority for such coverage and require the trial judge to consider
modifying the proceedings with a protective order rather than
denying the public access to this medium altogether.62
Permission for audio-visual coverage ceased in June 1997,
when the legislature failed to renew the authority to continue and
the Section 52 ban was reinstated. 63 As a result of this reinstate-
ment, New York remains one of the few states with such a broad
ban.64
It appears to be only a matter of time before this ban is lifted,
as a number of New York courts have recently found its constitu-
tionality suspect.65 Most notably, Judge Teresi of the New York
Supreme Court permitted audio-visual coverage of the Amadou
Diallo case after finding Section 52 unconstitutional under the
federal and state constitutions.66 The court emphasized how much
had changed since the ban had first been enacted.67 The court
noted the changes in technology, the absence of a ban in most
jurisdictions, and the success of New York's ten-year experiment
0 Id. § 131.4; see also Olesh, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 123-24 (noting that the
applicable rule allows for the consideration of whether the coverage of the case
would cause harm to any participant).
61 Cf Olesh, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 123 (observing that "[t]he tone of the rules is
undoubtedly that in the average case such coverage should be permitted with
limitation, if any, as set by the court and those further limitations which the rules
impose").
62 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 131.4(e) (1993).
63 Boss, 701 N.Y.S.2d at 893.
64 Id. at 894-95; see also Jay C. Carlisle, An Open Courtroom: Should
Cameras Be Permitted in New York State Courts?, 18 PAcE L. REv. 297 (1998).
65 See Boss, 701 N.Y.S.2d at 894; Coleman v. O'Shea, 707 N.Y.S.2d 308,
310 (Sup. Ct. 2000); cf People v. Santiago, 712 N.Y.S.2d 244, 256-57 (App.
Div. 2000) (noting trial courts that have allowed cameras in their courts),
overruled on procedural grounds sub nom. Santiago v. Bristol, 709 N.Y.S. 724
(App. Div. 2000) (ruling that the trial court acted outside its authority in allowing
media to intervene).
66 Boss, 701 N.Y.S.2d at 895.
67 Id. at 893-94; see also Coleman, 707 N.Y.S.2d at 310 (observing that
Section 52 was enacted at "television's dawn").
162
BEYOND NAMING AND BLAMING
with cameras.68 The court concluded: "The quest for justice in any
case must be accomplished under the eyes of the public. [Broadcast
coverage] will further the interests of justice, enhance public
understanding of the judicial system, and maintain a high level of
public confidence in the judiciary.' '69 The New York legislature
has recently introduced bills that would lift the broadcast ban.7°
Assuming that Section 52 is found unconstitutional, or that the
legislature decides to lift the broadcast ban, the question remains
whether audio-visual coverage should be permitted in family court
proceedings. One proposed bill would contain a presumption
against audio-visual coverage in most proceedings related to
children, allowing it only where the benefits to the public would
"substantially outweigh" the risks.71
A more restrictive access standard is arguably justified by the
different nature of the access sought and the heightened privacy
interests in family law matters. Television is considered to be more
prejudicial and less educative than the print media. Visual imagery
has a greater potential to distort, especially when the images are
chosen primarily for their salacious value.72 And unlike the access
68 Boss, 701 N.Y.S.2d at 893.
69 Id. at 895.
70 S. 6382, 1999 Leg., 223rd Sess. (N.Y. 1999); Assemb. 9071, 1999 Leg.,
222d Sess. (N.Y. 1999).
71 S. 6382(3)(c), 1999 Leg., 223rd Sess. (N.Y. 1999). The relevant language
of the pending legislation in the New York State Senate reads as follows:
The presiding trial judge shall not grant permission for audio-visual
coverage in any of the following types of cases unless the court finds
that the benefits to the public of audio-visual coverage substantially
outweigh the risks presented by such coverage: (I) a family court
proceeding, other than one brought pursuant to Article Three of the
Family Court Act; (II) any proceeding where audio-visual coverage is
likely to have a substantial adverse effect on the welfare of a child,
other than a criminal proceeding ... (III) any proceeding involving
allegations of domestic violence, child abuse or neglect, or sexual
abuse; (IV) a proceeding to which audio-visual coverage has been
objected to by the victim of a crime that is the subject of such
proceeding.
Id.
72 Lassiter, supra note 29, at 998; see also Melissa Corbett, Comment,
Lights, Camera, Trial: Pursuit of Justice or the Emmy?, 27 SEToN HALL L. REV.
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right possessed by the print media, the right to audio-visual
coverage has never been constitutionally recognized.73
But even a presumption against coverage limited to cases
involving children and families would be counter to the spirit of
access embodied in Rule 205.4. The Rule seems to tell us that
family court cases should be treated essentially like other cases,
with discretion to the court to consider the privacy interests of the
children 74 and other considerations such as the size of the court-
room.75 Part 131 of the administrative rules already permits a
carefully crafted balance of interests that can be applied in a
variety of different cases.76 A more restrictive rule would fail to
give the broadcast media the tools needed to tell their stories, as
the print media is given theirs through access to the courtroom.
In keeping with the spirit of openness embodied in Rule
205.4,77 and considering the goals of educating and reforming, I
would make two modifications to the discretionary factors set forth
in Rule 131.4. v7 First, I would not make the involvement of
children an entirely separate inquiry deserving "great weight," as
the rule currently does, but would consider it with the other factors,
such as "whether the coverage would cause harm to any partici-
pant. ' '79 Second, I would make an explicit consideration the
degree to which broadcasting the proceedings would further the
public interest. Although this factor already can be considered
under one of the other existing factors - such as "the type of case
involved"80 - it is not enough. The consideration should be more
explicit to emphasize the desire to satisfy the goals of educating
and reforming.
1542, 1565-68 (1997).
73 Lassiter, supra note 29, at 956.
7" See supra Part I.A (discussing the need to balance privacy interests with
the public interest when closure of the courtroom is sought).
71 Cf In re Howie, 526 N.Y.S.2d 727, 728 (Civ. Ct. 1998) (allowing for a
consideration of the physical limits of the small claims court on a case-by-case
basis).
76 See supra Part I.
77 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 205.4 (McKinney 1997).
78 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGs. tit. 22, § 131.4 (McKinney 1993).
7 Id. § 131.4(c)(2).
" Id. § 131.4(c)(1).
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C. Looking to the Future
Some of the recent coverage of family court proceedings
reflects the benefit of open access that the press and public now
enjoy. More importantly, it reflects on how reporting on these
proceedings can educate the public and eventually lead to legal
reform. For example, recent stories have covered, in intimate detail,
the inner workings of the family courts in Kings County8 and in
Bronx County.82 The articles have a "day-in-the-life" feel to them,
which allows the public to get a more complete and contextual
view of family court proceedings. The stories reflect the human
drama as well as the weariness that embodies this court.
Other recent stories have highlighted specific problems in the
existing system that need to be solved. For example, a recent case
discussed the problem of a court finding child abuse or neglect
when a mother, who is a battered woman herself, fails to protect
her children by failing to protect herself from the batterer.83
Perhaps, by exposing this problem to the public, a problem that is
well-known to those who work with battered women and their
children, 8' changes in the law would be more likely to occur.
"I In Court, supra note 5, at A36.
82 Hancock, supra note 5, at 1.
83 Somini Sengupta, Tough Justice: Taking a Child When One Parent is
Battered, N.Y. TIMEs, July 8, 2000, at Al.
84 Kim Ahearn et al., Charging Battered Mothers With "Failure to Protect":
Still Blaming the Victim, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 849, 849-50 (2000) (observing
that the increased awareness of the harm that domestic violence causes women
has resulted in increasing the number of abuse and neglect proceedings being
brought against battered mothers for their children's exposure to domestic
violence; arguing for a change in policy and practice to prevent battered mothers
from being punished for the risks to their children's well being caused by the
batterer); G. Kristian Miccio, A Reasonable Battered Mother? Redefining,
Reconstructing, and Recreating the Battered Mother in Child Protective
Proceedings, 22 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 89, 91-92 (1999) (discussing the failures
of state abuse and neglect statutes that hold battered mothers responsible by
removing children from their custody for failing to stop the abuse to themselves
and thereby causing harm to their children who are forced to witness the
continual abuse).
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The newly enacted Adoption and Safe Families Act ("AS-
FA")85 provides additional opportunities for reporting that both
educates and reforms. Already, the press has covered one of the
most problematic provisions of ASFA, the provision that requires
all foster parents to be fingerprinted. ASFA, as originally enacted,
mandated the removal of children from foster homes if a foster
parent previously had been convicted of certain felonies, and
created an irrebuttable presumption of unfitness.86 For example,
if a foster or adoptive parent had a record of one of these felony
convictions, such as homicide, he or she would be deemed per se
ineligible to care for the child regardless of how long the child had
lived with the foster family or how long ago the crime was
committed. The wisdom and constitutionality of this provision was
called into question by the courts and by the press. 87 Sub-
85 Adoption and Safe Families Act, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115
(1997) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The Congres-
sional legislation provides that in order for states to continue to receive further
funding, each state must enact its own version of the ASFA. The federal
government, for example, reimburses states for certain adoption and foster care
outlays pursuant to Title IV of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 674(c) (1994
& Supp. 111 1997). In order to avoid a loss of funding, New York has passed its
own ASFA scheme. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 358-a (McKinney Supp. 2000).
86 ASFA, even in its current amended form, mandates that all prospective
foster or adoptive parents provide fingerprints to authorized agencies. N.Y. Soc.
SERV. LAW § 378-a (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 2000), amended by S.B. 7892,
1999-2000 Reg. Sess. N.Y. 1999. These fingerprints are then used to "perform
a criminal history record check." Id. § 378-a(2)(A). ASFA further provides that
all applications for foster or adoptive parenthood be summarily denied where the
criminal history check reveals a previous criminal conviction for child or spousal
abuse, any crime perpetrated against a child, or crimes having to do with
"violence, including rape, sexual assault, or homicide" unless the parent makes
the requisite showing. Id. § 378-a(e)(1)(A). Whereas the original ASFA created
an irrebuttable presumption that a foster or adoptive parent was unfit, the
amended version establishes a rebuttable presumption with the burden of proof
now placed on the parent.
87 See, e.g., In re Adoption of Corey, 707 N.Y.S.2d 767, 773 (Fam. Ct.
1999) (finding that § 378-a(2)(e)(1) of ASFA violates the procedural due process
rights of foster children, as it fails to protect them from "arbitrary State decisions
which significantly impact their custody and welfare") (citation omitted); In re
Adoption of Jonee, 695 N.Y.S.2d 920, 925 (Fam. Ct. 1999) (holding that
ASFA's statutory per se presumption of unfitness violates the federal due process
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sequently, Governor Pataki signed into law a number of amend-
ments to ASFA, in part to ameliorate the constitutional infirmaties
in the initial fingerprinting provision.88 The press should take
advantage of other opportunities to discuss the significant effects
of ASFA on children and families. It appears that such coverage
has already begun.89
CONCLUSION
The recently enacted rule opening family courts to the press
and public is a significant first step towards educating and
reforming instead of naming and blaming. With this redefined role,
the press can act not only as a "watchdog," but also as a "fly on
the wall." And the new stories that are told, as well as the laws
that are eventually changed because of the telling of these stories,
will inure to the benefit of children and families throughout the
state.
clause absent an "individual determination") (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
LaFluer, 414 U.S. 632 (1974)); see Andrew Schepard, Child Protection
Revolution: Adoption and Safe Families Act, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 11, 1999, at 3; see
also supra Panel Discussion remarks of Commissioner Scoppetta, at pp. 146-47.
88 For a general overview of the law as currently constituted, see Douglas
H. Reiniger, Amending the Adoption and Safe Families Act, N.Y.L.J. July 18,
2000, at 1.
" See, e.g., Somini Sengupta, Pataki Urges Relaxing of Ban on Felons as
Foster Parents, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2000, at B9 (reporting on proposed
amendments to the ASFA offered by Governor Pataki); Joanne Wasserman,
Cutoff of Parental Rights Climbs, DAILY NEWS, Jan. 19, 2000, at 10 (reporting
that restrictions aimed at speeding up the adoption process have lead to an
increase in parental terminations).

